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CGIAR1. Introduction
The ﬁrst two Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to end ex-
treme poverty and hunger, achieve food security and improved nutri-
tion, and promote sustainable agriculture (UN General Assembly,
2014). The strategy and results framework of the CGIAR also identiﬁes
three system level outcomes (SLOs): reducing rural poverty, improving
food and nutrition security for health, and improving natural resources
and ecosystem services (CGIAR, 2015). The 2008 World Development
Report (World Bank, 2007) stressed the importance of agriculture-led
growth to achieve these targets. Although there are differences across
regions, productivity growth closely linked to investments in agricultur-
al research and development (R&D) has driven agriculture's global suc-
cess (Alston et al., 2000; Pardey et al., 2006; Raitzer and Kelley, 2008;
Renkow and Byerlee, 2010). International agricultural research (IAR)
plays an important role in exploiting advances in agricultural science
to improve the lives of the poor in developing countries (Zeigler and
Mohanty, 2010).
The international agricultural research centers (IARCs) that form the
CGIAR evolved as themain international systemof agricultural research.The CGIAR centers struggle to ﬁnd a balance between basic and strategic
research activities located on the upstream side, and delivery programs
located downstream. The general view has been that the CGIAR should
concentrate on the upstream side, conducting research that produces
international public goods (IPGs) (TAC Secretariat, 2000; Harwood et
al., 2006; Sagasti and Timmer, 2008; CGIAR Science Council, 2005,
2008, 2009). However, there is often no functional research-develop-
ment (R-D) pathway, which would ensure that CGIAR research results
are implemented on the ground. Financial constraints and the require-
ment by bilateral donors to show impact have pushed centers down
the R-D continuum, inducing them to engage in more location-speciﬁc
research and promotion activities (Pingali and Kelley, 2007; Bertram,
2006; Katyal and Mruthyunjaya, 2003; Anderson, 1998; Alston et al.,
1998).
To improve its structure and functions, the CGIAR system has
attempted reform efforts for decades (McCalla, 2014). In the latest re-
form, the work of the 15 centers is organized under the cross-cutting
CGIAR Research Programs (CRPs) (BCG, 2009:5; CGIAR Independent
Review Panel, 2008). Donors are expected to channel their funds
through the CGIAR Fund, which has three funding windows. Window
1 provides unrestricted contributions to be allocated to CRPs, while
Window 2 allows donors to target speciﬁc CRPs (CGIAR SRF, 2011).
Even though these two windows provide the opportunity to ﬁnance
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signiﬁcant proportion of funding is still allocated through Window 3.
Furthermore, bilateral1 projects still constitute a large proportion of
funding to the CGIAR. This indicates that, so far, a major objective of
the reform has not yet been achieved.
It is therefore crucial, as the CGIAR undergoes another phase of re-
form, to analyze the outstanding debate on what activities the centers
should focus on. This paper aims to contribute to this debate bydevelop-
ing a framework based on concepts of theNew Institutional Economics2
to identify the factors that determine the comparative advantage of
IARCs.
Froma normative point of view, the comparative advantage of IARCs
is related to the question as to what governance structure is best suited
for thedifferent types of transactions involved in research and in the im-
plementation of research ﬁndings. Transaction cost economics
(Shelanski and Klein, 1995; Brown and Potoski, 2003), a branch of the
New Institutional Economics, offers an analytical approach that aligns
transactions that differ in their attributes with governance structures
that differ in their costs and competence so as to achieve a cost-effective
result (Williamson, 1991). The paper adapts this framework to the spe-
ciﬁc features of agricultural research organizations to provide conceptu-
al guidance on how impact from IARCs can be achieved in themost cost-
effective way. To use this approach, it is necessary to specify the differ-
ent transactions involved in the development and uptake of products
from IAR. An empirical case study of an important area of agricultural
researchwas conducted for this purpose: research that aims to improve
legumecrops,which is supported by one of the CGIAR centers, the Inter-
national Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).
In the case study, an innovative research tool called “Net-Map” was
used. Net-Map is a participatory mapping technique (Schiffer and
Hauck, 2010), which was applied to identify the different activities
(transactions) and organizations involved in research on improved le-
gumes and their promotion. After developing a typology of transactions
based on the empirical study, a transaction cost economics framework
wasdeveloped andused to analyze the comparative advantage of differ-
ent organizations in conducting the different types of transactions. By
integrating contextual factors, the framework also serves to identify
why international centers engage in activities forwhich they are not ex-
pected to have a comparative advantage vis-à-vis national or local
organizations.
2. Assessing the comparative advantage of CGIAR centers
The question of the comparative advantage of the CGIAR has been
subject to long-standing debate. Two concepts have been developed in
this context: the concept of a research - development continuum, and
the concept of International Public Goods.
2.1. The agricultural research - development continuum
The concept of the research-development continuum is displayed in
Fig. 1 (Craswell and Penning de Vries', 2001; cited in CGIAR Science
Council, 2006, p. 74). Four types of research are identiﬁed: basic, strate-
gic, applied and adaptive.
According to this concept, the CGIAR should concentrate on strategic
research generating technologies that ﬁt relevant ecological and pro-
duction conditions across the developingworld. The centers should col-
laborate with ARIs, who have their focus on basic research, andwith the
National Agricultural Research and Extension Systems (NARES), who1 In 2015, contributions through the CGIAR Fund represented 59%of total funding ($554
million) and bilateral project grants represented 41% of funding ($389 million) (CGIAR
Fund Ofﬁce, 2015: 4).
2 The New Institutional Economics is a multidisciplinary ﬁeld that focuses on the role of
institutions in economic theory. It includes aspects of economics, history, sociology, polit-
ical science, business organization and law (Kherallah and Kirsten, 2001).cover the spectrum from strategic to applied and participatory-adaptive
research.
2.2. The concept of international public goods (IPGs) in the CGIAR
Economists differentiate pure public goods from private goods by
the two criteria of being non-rivalrous3 in consumption and non-
excludable4 (Samuelson, 1954:387). The rationale for public sector in-
volvement in agricultural research is based on the fact that agricultural
technologies have characteristics of public goods, especially if they are
not embodied in a particular technology, or – as in case of seeds – if
they can be reproduced by the farmers themselves. Integrated Natural
ResourceManagement (INRM) technologies in particular involve bene-
ﬁts that accrue to the entire community or watershed. Private ﬁrms
have limited interest since they do not have the capacity to capture
much of the beneﬁt through proprietary claims (Pingali and Kelley,
2007; Spielman, 2007). Publicly funded research centers at national
and international level are expected to step in to ﬁll this gap (Pineiro,
2007).
The view that CGIAR centers should focus on provision of public
goods at the international level (IPGs) began to be explicitly mentioned
in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Sagasti and Timmer, 2008; Kanbur,
2001). This concept has since been subject of discussion in various
fora (CGIAR Science Council, 2006, 2008; Harwood et al., 2006).
The IPG concept can be more easily applied to traditional CGIAR re-
search, like germplasm improvement and development of new crop va-
rieties, for which economies of scale and spill-over effects can be
determined more easily compared to other types of technologies or
knowledge, such as natural resource management (Ryan, 2006). Some
critics consider the IPG criterion as a conceptual barrier with an unreal-
istic division of labor between research and development that does not
give sufﬁcient attention to institutional constraints (CGIAR Science
Council, 2008). Besides, going by the basic deﬁnition of public goods,
every document placed on the internet with free access would fulﬁll
this IPG criterion whether or not it leads to achievement of CGIAR sys-
tem level outcomes.
These arguments show that there are contrasting views on whether
the IPG concept is reﬁned enough to be the key criterion that offers stra-
tegic direction on what the CGIAR centers should do or not do. Against
this background, this paper develops a more reﬁned framework to pro-
vide conceptual guidance for assessing the comparative advantage of
IARCs.
3. Methodology
The research presented in this paper consists of two components: (i)
A case study, which aims to provide a detailed account of the research
and dissemination process of improved technologies produced by
IARCs, and (ii) a conceptual framework, which deﬁnes the functional
boundaries of IARCs based on their comparative advantage, taking the
case study results into account.
To develop a transaction costs framework, it was important to un-
derstand all transactions involved in the R-D process. In order to achieve
this in a participatorymanner, theNet-mapprocedurewas chosen. It in-
volved asking a series of questions regarding themain actors, their link-
ages, and the level of inﬂuence of each actor on the intended outcome
(adoption of new varieties). Follow-up questions were asked on gover-
nance challenges involved in the process.
To develop the conceptual framework, the case studywas combined
with an application of the ﬁscal federalism literature (Oates, 1972) and3 The non-rivalry criterionmeans that any one person's consumption of the public good
has no effect on the amount of it available for others.
4 Non-excludability implies that it is either impossible or very costly to exclude those
who do not pay for the good from utilizing it, and once the good has been produced its
beneﬁts (or harm) accrue to everyone.
ARI= Advanced Research Institute, IARC= International Agricultural Research Centre, NGO= Non-
Governmental Organization, NARES= National Agricultural Research and Extension System (NARES)
Fig. 1. Primary domains across the research continuum of Integrated Natural Resource Management.
Source: CGIAR Science Council, 2006, p. 74.
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2004). This approach follows earlier applications of the ﬁscal federalism
literature and transaction costs economics to analyze the appropriate
level of decentralization for different types of rural services (Bardhan,
2002; Birner and von Braun, 2009).
4. Case study: The legumes improvement program at ICRISAT
The research and uptake process of CG7 groundnut variety can be
understood from the results of the Net-map tool presented in Fig. 2.
The arrows indicate the different activities (transactions), and the num-
bers indicate their sequence. The circles indicate the rating of inﬂuence2. Initial Crossing at ICRISAT, India
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81J. Kamanda et al. / Agricultural Systems 150 (2017) 78–85after donors provided resources for seed multiplication and promotion
to ICRISAT, NGOs and other seed producers. To date, even though gov-
ernment institutions like the Extension Department and Department
of Agricultural Research Services (DARS) do exist, capacity gaps still re-
main and the ICRISAT Malawi ofﬁce continues to be engaged in down-
stream activities. This explains why during the Netmap exercise (Fig.
2) the centerwas rankedhighest in termsof level of inﬂuence on thede-
sired outcome, i.e. wide adoption of CG7 among farmers.
5. Conceptual framework
The transaction cost economics approach used here is based on the
so-called “discriminating alignment hypothesis” developed by
Williamson (1991), according to which “transactions that differ in
their attributes are aligned with governance structures that differ in
costs and competence so as to achieve an economizing result”
(Williamson, 1991, p. 281). The ﬁrst sub-section introduces the basic
structure of this framework, and the following sub-sections apply the
framework using the case study results.
5.1. Determining the comparative cost-effectiveness of IARCs versus nation-
al systems
The decision on whether a transaction should be carried out by an
IARC or a national organization can be conceptualized as a choice be-
tween amore centralized (international) and amore decentralized (na-
tional) governance structure. The choice between these governance
structures is inﬂuenced by the attributes of the respective transactions.
Fig. 3, which is based on Williamson's (1991) original approach, illus-
trates this choice problem in a cost-effectiveness5 diagram.
The vertical axis displays the total cost involved in achieving a spec-
iﬁed result of the respective transaction, including transaction costs and
other costs. The horizontal axis depicts the level of the attributes that in-
ﬂuence the comparative advantage of different governance structures.
The ﬁgure displays two hypothetical cost curves,6 which show how
the total costs arising for achieving a speciﬁed result change, depending
on the level of the attribute displayed on the horizontal axis. One curve5 Costs associated with achieving a set outcome are analyzed the outcome being held
constant
6 While the above comparison considers IARCs and NARES, we recognize that there are
many other actors in the agricultural R&D process. IARCs oftenwork in collaboration with
partners on joint research projects.depicts the costs arising for carrying out the transaction by an IARC
(TCi), and the other depicts the costs for carrying out the same transac-
tion by NARES (TCn).
The ﬁscal federalism literature (Oates, 1972) identiﬁes economies of
scale and potential for spillovers as important factors, which inﬂuence
the appropriate level of decentralization. These factors are considered
as attributes of transactions here. In the example displayed in the ﬁgure,
the costs of providing the transaction increasemore rapidly for the gov-
ernance structure of the NARES (i.e. to the more decentralized gover-
nance structure), if the level of the respective attribute, for example,
economies of scale, increases (moving to the right-hand side on the hor-
izontal axis). This is indicated by the relatively steeper slope of the TCn
cost curve. If the potential for economies of scale is low (moving to
the left-hand side on the horizontal axis), the transaction is more eco-
nomically provided by NARES. From point a1 onwards, it is more eco-
nomic to assign the transaction to the IARC (i.e. to the more
centralized governance structure), because the IARC will achieve the
same result at a lower cost. Phrased differently, the diagram shows
that from point a1 onwards, the governance structure of the IARC has
a comparative advantage over NARES for carrying out the respective
transaction.
Following the considerations of the IPG criterion explained above,
the rationale is that the IARCs have higher set-up costs and higher run-
ning costs than NARES. Taking the case study as example, the salaries of
ICRISAT researchers aremuchhigher than those of staff employed in the
NARES in Malawi. IARCs have a comparative advantage if they use their
more expensive set-up to engage in activities with high economies of
scale, such as applying expensive breeding techniques for crops that
can be grown in different regions.
The same argument applies to the attribute of spill-over effects, as in-
dicated above. Technologies are said to have spillover potential if they
have applicability to other agro-ecological locations or for a different
crop (Davis et al., 1987; Bantilan and Davis, 1991; Deb and Bantilan,
2001; Shiferaw et al., 2004). Since the CGIAR centers have a global man-
date, the research objectives and associated outputs are more likely to
beneﬁt other regions or countries (i.e. the potential impact domain is
wider). It can, therefore, be expected that more farmers will be reached
resulting in lower costs for a given outcome (level of adoption).
The framework also identiﬁes the role of contextual factors, in par-
ticular, the capacity of the respective organizations carrying out the
transaction. In a cost-effectiveness diagram, low levels of achievement
due to capacity constraints are depicted in form of a higher level of
costs, since the diagram displays the costs for a deﬁned unit of output.
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shift of the respective cost curve (TCc). Accordingly, the point from
which IARCs have a comparative advantage over NARESmoves towards
the left-hand side to a2. A reform or investment that results in increased
capacity of the NARES would have the opposite effect (moving the TCn
curve downwards and shifting the intersection of the curves to the
right-hand side).
The application of the transaction costs framework to the question of
decentralization has shown that the effect of some attributes on the
level of decentralization depends on contextual factors (Birner and
von Braun, 2009). This is in particular the case for the following two
attributes:
• Transaction-intensity: This attribute refers to transactions that have to
be carried out frequently (transaction-intensity in terms of time) and
in large areas (transaction-intensity in terms of space). Transaction in-
tensity has been used to characterize transactions in service delivery
(Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004; Birner and Linacre, 2008; Birner and
von Braun, 2009). The effect of transaction-intensity is ambiguous:
On the one hand, this attribute increases the comparative advantage
of NARES, because they have lower costs for carrying out a large num-
ber of transactions. On the other hand, the costs of supervising and en-
suring the quality of activities with high transaction-intensity are
high. This increases the comparative advantage of organizations
with high capacity that are able to provide strong performance incen-
tives for their staff. In case of low capacity of the NARES, transaction-
intensity will increase the comparative advantage of the IARCs.
• Scope for elite capture and corruption: If transactions are subject to
these hazards, the extent to which a more centralized or a more
decentralized organization has a comparative advantage depends on
the capacity of the respective organizations to deal with these issues
(Bardhan, 2002; Birner and von Braun, 2009).
5.2. Types of transactions and their attributes
5.2.1. Overview
This section discusses how the approach outlined above can be ap-
plied in determining the comparative advantage of IARCs versus
NARES in carrying out the agricultural research and development activ-
ities identiﬁed in the case study. For simpliﬁcation, one can classify the
types of transactions identiﬁed in the case study into the following
types:
• Planning and priority setting: The identiﬁcation of breeding objec-
tives (Step 1 in Fig. 2) can be considered as a planning and priority set-
ting transaction. Some breeding objectives can be considered rather
universal, such as yield potential, while others are affected by a diver-
sity of local preferences, such as taste and color.
• Technology development: This includes activities related to the actu-
al breeding. In Fig. 2, activities from the initial crossing at the ICRISAT
headquarters until the variety was incorporated into national breed-
ing programs for evaluation (steps 2–3) can be classiﬁed under tech-
nology development transactions.
• Field testing and varietal release: Promising cultivars were tested at
the ICRISAT experiment stations before further testing in different
agro-ecologies, and later in farmers' ﬁelds. Varieties were approved
for release if data from multi-locational testing indicated that they
performed better compared to the existing best variety (steps 4–5 in
Fig. 2).
• Multiplication: To obtain the required volumes of improved seed for
sale/distribution, seedmultiplicationwas carried out in seed company
farms or by using contract growers. Many of the activities between
steps 6–15 in Fig. 2 involved seed production, processing, storage
and distribution.
• Certiﬁcation: Seed certiﬁcation, usually by an independent body suchas the Seed Services Unit (SSU) inMalawi, is used as ameans of quality
control (Byerlee et al., 2007).
• Promotion: Details of the activities promotion conducted by
ICRISAT together with NGOs and various departments under Min-
istry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) can be seen in
steps 8–13 of Fig. 2.
• Evaluation and impact assessment: Impact assessments (ex-post
or ex-ante) are carried out to measure the economic, social, and
environmental consequences resulting from a project's interven-
tions (Walker et al., 2008). Ex-post evaluations serve as a means
of showing accountability to donors and other stakeholders, and
also help in learning on how tomake agricultural researchmore ef-
fective (Horton and Mackay, 2003).
Having categorized the activities (transactions) identiﬁed from the
case study, we can nowmake an assessment of the relevance of each at-
tribute identiﬁed in Section 5.1 for each of the transactions. The results
are summarized in Table 1.5.2.2. Planning and priority setting transactions
Priority setting activities together with resource mobilization re-
quire interaction with donors and other stakeholders who have knowl-
edge on constraints facing the farming communities. These activities are
associated with costs of attendingmeetings and time spent in donor re-
lations. The new system under CRPs was expected to exploit economies
of scale and reduce transaction costs of interface activities.Whether this
has been realized or whether the requirement that the centers work
more closely together in CRPs has increased transaction costs is an em-
pirical question for further research.
Planning transactions at the centers' level can be associated with at-
tributes of economies of scale and potential for spillovers and a more
centralized approach is likely to reduce the costs. However, planning
for the purpose of pursuing location-speciﬁc goals can be done more
cost-effectively by national agencies as it would otherwise involve
high transaction intensity for the centers.5.2.3. Technology development transactions
The running costs for research activities conducted by national sys-
tem scientists may be lower compared to IARCs. However, depending
on the sophistication of techniques required, failure costs may be in-
curred if the research is delegated to a partner that does not have the re-
quired skill sets. Where technical knowledge is relevant, such as basic
research activities (Fig. 1), IARCs may be more suited to exploit econo-
mies of scale in providing or utilizing this knowledge. An example is
the ICRISAT genomics research that is based at its headquarters in
India, but serves the needs of both Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
Where the potential for spillovers is high, research programs and infra-
structure can be centrally set upwith assurance that the products can be
transferred and applied in similar environments elsewhere (Maredia
and Byerlee, 1999; Alston et al., 2011; Brennan, 1986; Brennan and
Bantilan, 2003; Brennan et al., 2003; Pardey et al., 1996; Shiferaw et
al., 2004).
Basic and strategic research transactions can therefore be associated
with attributes of high economies of scale and high potential for spill-
overs. Since a lot of interaction with farmers or travel to dispersed
ﬁeld locations is not required at this stage, basic and strategic research
activities can be characterized by low transaction intensity. In this
case, a more centralized approach is likely to reduce transaction costs.
However, participatory and adaptive research activities having low
economies of scale and low potential for spillovers and involving evalu-
ation of breeding lines in different agro-ecologies across the country can
be carried out most cost-effectively by the decentralized national
systems.
Table 1
Transactions and their attributes.
Transactions
Relevance of attributes
Economies of scale (incl. asset speciﬁcity) Spillover potential Transaction intensity Scope for elite capture and corruption
Planning and priority setting
Generic goals High High Medium Low
Location-speciﬁc goals Low Low High Medium
Technology development
Basic - strategic High High Low Low
Adaptive - participatory Low Low High Medium
Field testing and varietal release Low Low High Medium
Multiplication Low Low High Medium
Certiﬁcation Low Low Medium High
Promotion Low Low High High
Evaluation/impact assessment Medium Medium Medium Medium
Source: Authors
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Field testing transactions have similar attributes to participatory and
adaptive research since they involve testing of selected varieties across
environments. However, the application of tight controls on variety re-
lease and seed trade involves scope for elite capture and corruption.
Plant breeders from the public sector are protected from competition
as only varieties approved by the varietal release committee can be
sold. These committees are composed of ofﬁcials from the samemonop-
olies and release is based on yields documented in government-run tri-
als (Tripp and Rohrbach, 2001). In the case of groundnut variety
ICGV91114 in India, although the performance of the variety was evi-
dent, it may not have been released without lobbying from ICRISAT
and the intervention of the Chief Minister (Birthal et al., 2012). This
means that even though NARES should ideally have a comparative ad-
vantage in ﬁeld testing and varietal release based on the attributes of
low economies of scale and potential for spillovers and high transaction
intensity, the scope for elite capture and corruption make this decision
less straightforward.
5.2.5. Multiplication transactions
Breeder seed is produced by research stations while foundation and
certiﬁed seed is produced by state corporations and private ﬁrms. Seed
production under centralized seed company farms may have higher
economies of scale but depending on the location of processing, storage
anddistribution facilities therewill be additional costs of transportation.
Use of decentralized systems such as contract growers has high transac-
tion intensity as constant supervision is required. These factors imply
that seed multiplication can be carried out most cost-effectively by
NARES rather than IARCs.
However, as was observed in Malawi, these organizations often lack
the resources and incentives to perform this function as required.
Breeder seed production is not funded separately from the actual breed-
ing activities, the NARES have insufﬁcient numbers of research and seed
technicians, they lack processing, storage and distribution infrastruc-
ture, and breeders are rewarded for varieties they release and not
seed multiplied. For this reason, ICRISAT was forced to engage in seed
production activities even though they have high transaction intensity.
5.2.6. Certiﬁcation transactions
Seed certiﬁcation has high transaction intensity as it involves ﬁeld
inspections of the seed crop to guarantee the identity of the variety
(Cromwell et al., 1992; Tripp and Louwaars, 1997). The fact that certiﬁ-
cation agencies are mostly ﬁnanced by the government makes them
vulnerable to budgetary constraints.
5.2.7. Promotion transactions
Technologies that are available for dissemination require local adap-
tation,whichmakes it difﬁcult to standardize extension and reduces the
economies of scale and likelihood of spillovers. Promotion programsalso have high transaction intensity as they require frequent interac-
tions with farmers and the deployment of multiple staff throughout
the country. These transactions should therefore be the responsibility
of national systems who have local ofﬁces to facilitate monitoring and
supervision and reduce transaction costs.
5.2.8. Evaluation and impact assessment transactions
Impact assessment and project reporting activities involve costs for
data collection, analysis and write-up. These costs escalate when the
centers have a large number of bilateral projects with small budgets
that need to be reported separately.
We can conclude from the examples in the case study that the attri-
butes of economies of scale and potential for spillovers, which are also
recognized in the literature in international public goods, increase the
comparative advantage (cost-effectiveness) of IARCs over NARES in car-
rying out the transaction. In addition, we identify transaction intensity
and the scope for elite capture and corruption as important - but ambig-
uous - attributes that depend on the context and make the decision on
comparative advantage less straightforward.
6. Conclusions
In agricultural research for development, there is nomarket mecha-
nism which ensures that the most efﬁcient governance structures sur-
vive. Research managers therefore have to deﬁne the most
appropriate institutional structures to achieve impact with a given set
of resources. The analysis undertaken in this paper deals with long-
standing concerns regarding the governance of IARCs, which the cur-
rently ongoing CGIAR reform process also aims to address. The review
of past discussions in the literature and in various fora identiﬁed a gap
in the availablemethodologies thatwould allow the CGIAR to objective-
ly tackle the dilemma of how the centers should position themselves in
the R-D spectrum.
The framework presented in this paper is consistent with earlier ap-
proaches, especially the IPG criterion, but it provides additional insights,
especially regarding the role of governance challenges and capacity con-
straints in inﬂuencing the comparative advantage of the CGIAR. Based
on the consideration of the relevant attributes of transactions, and con-
textual factors, the framework makes it possible to assess the trade-offs
involved in cost-effectively assigning an activity to IARCs, NARES or
other actors in the innovation system. Transactions with high econo-
mies of scale and spillover potential should be ideally assigned to a cen-
tralized institution (IARC)while thosewith high transaction intensity to
a more decentralized institution (NARES or other partner). While these
implications are easier to derive for research and strategic research, the
other activities involve trade-offs depending on the context, technology
and intended objective.
An important factor emerging from the case study and the hypothet-
ical cost curves above is the inﬂuence of contextual factors, especially
capacity of the national systems. The lack of core funds and political
84 J. Kamanda et al. / Agricultural Systems 150 (2017) 78–85pressure, e.g., donor preferences, will inﬂuence the decision by CGIAR
centers to carry out speciﬁc activities. Donors have the goal to achieve
impact in poor areas, but themain problem is the capacity gapof nation-
al organizations. There is a choice to be made between investment in
the tedious and long-term task of strengthening local capacity, or
avoiding these capacity challenges by driving international centers
into downstream activities. The latter option reduces the incentives
for national governments to overcome the governance challenges in
their national systems. Ultimately, to make international investment
in agricultural research sustainable in the long-term, the centers and
their donors should devise ways of addressing the capacity challenges
of NARES.
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